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Recent Cases
EvIDENCE-SEAxcII AND SEIZUBE-ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE OBTAINED
IN SEARCH INCIDENTAL To LAWFUL ARRET-Indictments were returned
against the defendant and his wife charging them with selling alcoholic
beverages in local option territory. Bench warrants were thereupon
issued ordering their arrest. Armed with these valid warrants, officers
went to defendant's residence, found only the wife at home and took
her into custody. The officers proceeded to thoroughly search the
house finding six halfpints of gin and eight cases of beer. Some of the
beverages were found in a rear room, and the remainder in the
kitchen. Defendant was subsequently arrested and both he and his
wife were indicted, this time for having in their possession intoxicating
beverages for purpose of sale in local option territory. Upon trial under
the last idictment, the liquor seized by the officers was admitted as evi-
dence over the defendant's timely motion to quash and he was con-
victed. Held: Reversed. The search of a man's home incidental to
the lawful arrest of his wife therein, without his or her consent, con-
travenes section 101 of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of
Kentucky, and evidence so obtained is incompetent and inadmissible in
a prosecution of the husband. Benge v. Commonwealth, 321 S.W. 2d
247 (Ky. 1959).
The rule is well established in Kentucky that evidence obtained
through unlawful search and seizure is inadmissible.2 If the search of
a man's home incidental to his lawful arrest therein is unlawful, it
follows that evidence so obtained is inadmissible.
Until the decision in the principal case, the Kentucky law was that
silence amounted to consent, and if the arrestee made no objection,
the search was not unlawful.3 Further, a search was held not to be
I Ky. Const., § 10 provides:
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and pos-
sessions, from unreasonable search and seizure; and no warrant
shall issue to search any place, or seize any person or thing, with-
out describing them as nearly as may be, nor without probable
cause supported by oath or affirmation.2 Johnson v. Commonwealth, 296 S.W.2d 210 (Ky. 1956); Reed v. Com-
monwealth, 233 Ky. 184, 25 S.W.2d 77 (1930); Russel v. Commonwealth,
232 Ky. 353, 23 S.W.2d 546 (1930); Jones v. Commonwealth, 227 Ky. 157,
12 S.W.2d 280 (1928); Thomas v. Commonwealth, 226 Ky. 101, 10 S.W.2d
606 (1928); Clark v. Commonwealth, 204 Ky. 740, 265 S.W. 280 (1924); Mabry
v. Commonwealth, 196 Ky. 626, 245 S.W. 129 (1922); Price v. Commonwealth,
195 Ky. 711, 243 S.W. 927 (1922); Youman v. Commonwealth, 189 Ky. 152,
224 S.W. 860 (1920).
3 Hightower v. Commonwealth, 286 Ky. 561, 151 S.W.2d 39 (1941); Pat-
ton v. Commonwealth, 273 Ky. 258, 116 S.W.2d 311 (1938); Harrison v. Com-
monwealth, 266 Ky. 840, 100 S.W.2d 837.
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unlawful if made incidental to a lawful arrest, where a public offense
for which the arrest was made was being committed in the officer's
presence.4
. In the principal case the court said that according to the testimony
of the officers making the arrest the wife did not consent to the
search.4a There is no evidence, however, that she objected to the
search. It seems this fact could bring the case within the rule pre-
viously stated.
There was available to the court another case, Commonwealth v.
Phillips,5 on which it could have easily rested its decision if it had been
disposed to take a contrary view. Although distinguishable on its
facts, the statements made in that opinion would be applicable to
the principal case. The arrestee had given his consent for the officers
to search a bureau in his house, and the officers proceeded to search
a pair of overalls hanging in the hall behind a door. The court upheld
the search extending beyond that which the arrestee had consented
to on the ground that his consent to search part of the premises neces-
sarily included the right to make the search "effective and complete."
The court in the course of the opinion uttered the following dictum:
It is clear that the officer not only has the lawful power to search
the person, premises, and possessions of the prisoner when law-
fully arrested in order that he may gather such evidence as exists,
but he would be blameworthy if he failed to do so. [Emphasis added]6
Then after concluding that consent to search part of the premises
included the right to make the search effective and complete, the court
said:
But, as we have seen, his consent was not necessary to authorize the
officers to make the search they made on the occasion in question.7
The court in the principal case apparently intended to remove any
ambiguity that may have previously existed and preclude the elevation
of this dictum into decision, by establishing a hard and fast rule ap-
plicable to searches and seizures incidental to a lawful arrest insofar
as homes are concerned.
The general rule is that search of a home without a search warrant
is unlawful.8 An exception to this rule obtains in many jurisdictions
where the search is made incidental to a lawful arrest.9
4 Davis v. Commonwealth, 280 S.W.2d 714 (Ky. 1955).
4a See Manning v. Commonwealth, 328 S.W.2d 421 (Ky. 1959). The
consent of the wife who was not arrested, to search the residence, did not re-
move the need for a search warrant. The search was held to be unreasonable
and the evidence obtained inadmissible.
5 224 Ky. 117, 5 S.W.2d 887 (1928).
6 Id. at 122, 5 S.W.2d at 888.
7 Id. at 123, 5 S.W.2d at 889.
8 See Moreland, Modem Criminal Procedure 118 (1959).
9 Argetalds v. State, 24 Ariz. 599, 212 P. 372 (1923); State v. Carenza.
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RECENT CASES
One statement as to derivation of this exception is found in the case
of United States v. Rabinowitz.'0 The court there said:
The right "to search the place where the arrest is made in order to
find and seize things connected with the crime as its fruits or as
the means by which it was committed" seems to have stemmed
not only from the acknowledged authority to search the person,
but also from the long standing practice of searching for other
proofs of guilt within the control of the accused found upon ar-
rest.11
The justification for this exception has been explained upon the
theory that the Constitution only prohibits 12 "unreasonable" searches
and seizures, and that the circumstances may be such that a search
incidental to a lawful arrest without a search warrant is perfectly rea-
sonable and not within the constitutional prohibition. 13
The Supreme Court of the United States in two rather recent cases
has held searches of the premises in which the defendant was ar-
rested not to be in violation of the Fourth Amendment. In Harris v.
United States, a four-room apartment was thoroughly searched in an
attempt to find two cancelled checks, which were evidence of the
crime for which the defendant was being arrested. The reasonable-
ness of the search was justified on the ground that the defendant was
in the exclusive possession of the apartment, and that the checks could
have been concealed in any of the four rooms. 14
357 Mo. 1172, 212 S.W.2d 743 (1948); State ex rel. Wong You v. District
Court, 106 Mont. 347, 78 P.2d 353 (1938); State ex rel. Fong v. Superior Court,
29 Wash.2d 601, 188 P.2d 125 (1948), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 956 (1949);
State v. Adams, 103 W. Va. 77, 136 S.E. 703 (1927) (lawful search limited
to the room in which the arrest was made).
10339 U.S. 56 (1950).
11United States v. Rabinowitz, 839 U.S. 56, 61 (1950).
12 U.S. Const. amend. IV, provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seziures, shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
13 The majority speaking through Mr. Justice Minton in United States v.
Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56,60 (1950):
It is unreasonable searches that are prohibited by the Fourth Amend-
ment... It was recognized by the framers of the Constitution that
there were reasonable searches for which no warrant was required.
The right of the "people to be secure in their persons" was certainly
of as much concern to the framers of the Constitution as the property
of the person. Yet no one questions the right, without a search war-
rant, to search the person after a valid arrest.
14331 U.S. 145 (1947). In this case, the search produced eight Notice of
Classification cards and eleven registration certificates bearing the stamp of
Local Board No. 7 Oklahoma County. The defendant was convicted under an
indictment charging unlawful possession, concealment and alteration of the
cards and certificates. The Court held these subject to seizure on the ground
that the possession thereof amounted to a continuing offense against the laws
of the United States.
1960]
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In Rabinowitz, the business premises of the defendant, consisting
of a one-room office, were searched incident to his arrest therein under
valid warrants charging the sale of forged stamps. 15 The reasonable-
ness of this search was justified on the grounds that the place was a
business room to which the public, including the officers, was invited;
the search did not extend beyond the room used for unlawful purposes;
and, the possession of the forged altered stamps was a crime which
rendered the search one for the objects used in the perpetration of
the crime, and not merely a search for evidentiary materials.
The court, in any case in which search and seizure is involved, is
confronted with the problem of balancing the interest of the people, as
a community, in the suppression of crime, and the interest of the peo-
ple in maintaining and protecting the privacy of the individual. A
difficult task involved in searches incidental to lawful arrests is draw-
ing the line establishing the limits within which a search will not be
unreasonable and therefore not in violation of constitutional rights.
When a court has sanctioned such searches the possibilities for them
become almost unlimited.
Once officers know that they can search premises incidental to a
valid arrest, it is a fair assumption that in their zeal to apprehend crim-
inals they will be prone to conduct such searches. From their point of
view there is always the possibility that they may find something of
evidentiary value, and that a court may well conclude that the search
was reasonable. As an example, it is quite possible for an innocent per-
son to be lawfully arrested in some cases upon "reasonable belief."-6
If the arrest is so made, the requirements of "probable cause," sup-
ported by "oath or affirmation," and a "description as nearly as may
be of the things to be seized" are completely replaced by the "reason-
able belief' of the officer making the arrest. Certainly the search of an
innocent person's home upon the "reasonable belief" of the officer is
not desirable. This renders that portion of the constitution prohibiting
unreasonable searches and seizures meaningless, and offers little if any
protection from intrusions upon the privacy of the individual.
The argument could be made that if the search was "unreasonable"
15 Although the warrant was not put in evidence, it contained, as a govern-
ment witness testified on cross examination, more than just the sale of forged
stamps. It contained other information which had been obtained through
statements by a printer taken into custody with overprinting plates in his posses-
sion, that the defendant was one of his customers to whom he had delivered
large amounts of stamps bearing forged overprints. United States v. Rabinowitz,
339 U.S. 56 (1950).
16Ky. Cr. Code § 36 (1959) provides:
A peace officer may make an arrest . .. [without warrant for arrest]
when he has reasonable grounds for believing that the person ar-
rested has committed a felony.
[Vol. 48,
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the evidence would be inadmissible. This protects the defendant from
the use of evidence so obtained, and the common interest of the peo-
ple in the suppression of crime far outweighs the inconvenience suf-
fered by the individual. Or, if the search was "reasonable," the rights
of the individual have not been infringed upon. However, this line of
reasoning affords the individual no protection whatsoever from a
search; it merely prevents the use of evidence so obtained if, and only
if, the search is determined to be unreasonable. This is surely not what
the framers of the Kentucky Constitution intended when they made
provision for the people to "be secure in their persons, houses, paper
and possessions, from unreasonable search and seizure."
When, however, a court rules that a search of one's home incidental
to a valid arrest therein is unlawful and evidence so obtained is inad-
missible, the incentive for such searches is greatly diminished. As a
result officers desiring to search one's home will not do so until the
constitutional requirements have been fulfilled, thereby insuring the
privacy of the individual against unwarranted invasions.
It would appear that the policy adopted by the Kentucky court in
the principal case could well be summarized in the words of Mr. Jus-
tice Holmes in his dissenting opinion in the case of Olmstead V. United
States:'
7
It is desirable that criminals should be detected, and to that end
that all available evidence should be used. It also is desirable that
the Government should not itself foster and pay for other crimes,
when they are the means by which the evidence is to be obtained....
We have to choose, and for my part I think it a less evil that some
criminals should escape than that the Government should play an
ignoble part.'8
It is submitted that if the effect of the principal case is to establish
a hard and fast rule that the search of a man's home incidental to his
lawful arrest therein, without his consent, is unlawful, the purpose and
intent of the framers of the Constitution to insure the security of the
people in their homes from unreasonable search and seizure, will be
served. This is true notwithstanding the fact that some few criminals
will escape conviction because the necessary evidence to establish
their guilt could not be obtained in a search of their home incidental
to their lawful arrest therein.
William A. Logan
17 227 U.S. 488 (1928).
Is Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 488, 470 (1928).
19601
